Following Lee Braver’s exposition (in his 2007 book A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism), HD list six theses about which one might come down on the side of realism or antirealism: R1/A1: The world is not/is dependent on the mind. R2/A2: Truth is/is not correspondence. R3/A3: There is/is not one true, complete description of how the world is. R4/A4: Any statement is/is not necessarily either true or untrue. R5/A5: Knowledge is/is not passive with respect to what it knows. R6/A6: The human subject does/does not have a fixed character. To these, Harman adds: R7/A7: The relation of the human subject with the world is not/is a privileged relation for philosophy. Harman complains about A7 a lot: “correlationists,” he believes, are so committed to the “for-us” that they never consider that there are plenty of other things out there which are not human subjects, and that the relations between those things don’t depend in any way on our own capacities. As he notes, one could, with Kant apparently, believe both R1 and A7; so already we have a subtler, if potentially more inconclusive, treatment than we have seen previously. Next, Delanda adds: R8/A8: The world is not/is a holistic entity in which everything is inextricably related. 3quarksdaily com/3quarksdaily/2019/04/new-realism-roundup html