/pt/ – Petrarchan

>>10982 not taking cash is pretty common in yurop these days, unless you are somewhere retarded like germany, where I missed a train on thursday, because I had to run a kilometer to take cash out from a machine to settle my bar tab.

>>10982 Europe is a very patchwork continent of places that haven't seen paper & coin currency in years (London, Sweden is even worse) and places where you have to travel out of your way to find a bankomat/ATM (Germany, rural areas, the Balkans). Of course as a digital privacy zealot I hate cashless societies, and I'm not a huge fan of the Eurozone either. I hold out hope that The Big One - meaning, a large-scale cyberattack or shutdown - will curb this tendency as people realize paper doesn't stop working when the internet cuts out.

>>10986 in my travels, I've noticed that the euros are generally more digital/card friendly (seems to be a north-south divide) but I feel like I've not encountered a total cashless state until experiencing London. im not sure why I found it unnerving or strange, because if I'm being honest, Ive basically never used petty cash as my default monetary choice. if im being dramatic, it feels like throwing your lot in with modernity in a very reckless way, letting those above you have the financial reins. Im not /really/ one of those "cash is king, they are spying on your statements" people, because cash is as ethereal as a card if I think about it (why is my greenback worth anything? I don't know, but I need to buy bread so here I am). but using your card/phone as your daily system of exchanging money and goods feels wrong on a phenomenal level. plus all the card companies are American so I feel like its a leaky faucet for the economy (ie fees and support is lost to a different economy), but i guess if the UK doesnt care about that its not a problem. also I'm kind of a currency autist but not in a serious manner, so its sad to lose that continuous link between time and space which hard currency provides. I find the euro to be so interesting because you end up with some other country's currency across the continent. it really feels like a human endeavor. so much effort goes into the design of a coin or a bill, and into how it reflects the spirit of a nation, and a Visa card just says CHASE BANK or whatever. that being said, i basically choose the convenience of using a card 99% of the time.

>>10997 I basically agree with everything here. I'm not anti-cash, I even went through a phase of ostentatiously carrying it and using it when everyone else was just tapping their phones. I like that it exists and I would be upset if I couldn't use it in supermarkets, kebab shops, bars and the like. But it seems frankly obstinate though for businesses not to accept cards in the present day. It's really not expensive for them and it's obviously useful for customers. The only good reason I can think of is tax dodging, but I tend to assume that Germans don't do that. The good argument which I'm aware of and don't know how to properly rebut is that when there are no situations where cash can be used and cards can't then cash will basically die out. I'm not sure this is true though. I think a lot of people, even young people, still appreciate the opportunity to pay cash from time to time, even if it's not their usual way of doing things. And I think businesses find it useful to have petty cash behind the till. I'm not exactly advocating for full-scale tax avoidance but frankly I think it makes the gears of the economy turn smoother if a small amount of transacting can be done beyond the reach of the exchequer...

>>11008 Your example reminds me of "bad money pushes out good money" in a funny way. The users of money have strange ideas of what is the most convenient or best way of bartering for their things. I think tax dodging small businesses is better than succumbing to big card businesses/banks/etc getting to do all the dodging. Let the kebab man have a win. When I was shocked to find London a cash-free zone, I looked this up and found very amusing threads of rabid Londoner redditors who despised the ideas of cash and were pleased that tax dodging businesses would be squashed out of existence. Maybe a better reason (for me) to prefer cash is that those who don't are annoying petite bourgeois snitches that desire convenience above all.

>>11008 You'd be surprised. At least in Berlin, there's a fair bit of money laundering among the Turkish community etc. Mostly through spätis and sushi places that nobody goes into.

>>11009 Can I ask why you dislike the Eurozone? I've never thought about it before, but as I go through Europe, it's struck me as a very unusual thing. It unites so many places under one currency, but seems to struggle under that same weight. I like it in concept, but truthfully don't know much about the thing. EU bureaucracy and surveillance state though does make me wary.

>>11010 To clarify, I don't consider myself a "Euro-skeptic", as this term carries a lot of political and social baggage in Europe, especially in the East where Euro adoption is still undergoing or a present question, or in the UK obvs. I would describe my dislike of the Eurozone as more of a skepticism towards centralization of power and decision-making. - The Euro makes sense for the "core" EU countries whose economies already had a tight degree of interdependence beforehand. There was already a monetary union of sorts between France and some neighboring states even before WWII. And many European currencies were pegged to bigger currencies, like the Deutsche Mark. In fact, the idea of a cross-country economic union isn't unique to the Euro. For example there are monetary unions in the Caribbean and Africa. There are also unofficial, de facto monetary unions like in North America, where the US dollar is valid legal tender in some surrounding countries, like Panama, the Pacific island compact states, and ironically the technically European Union territories of the Dutch Caribbean. - The Euro, the European Union, and so on are descendants of post-World War II concerns about really figuring out this nation state stability thing, and progressing forward as a European continent. I believe we don't live in the same world that produced the relational conditions that led to the World Wars, and that preventing active conflict between European nations is not the dominant paradigm by which we should live under. - The Euro was originally not just about integration and centralization, but was offered to the public as a *practical* improvement over their lives. In the 80s and 90s, digitalization had not taken course yet, and traveling between European countries meant carrying a mini-bank of currencies with you, planning ahead to visit currency exchanges, and the general headache and mathematics that comes along with juggling multiple currencies. Businesses had to deal with juggling multiple currencies as well. We don't live in that world anymore. I can swipe my card at any terminal and pay for whatever, and the thing is, I can do that even in a non-Euro country and the transaction is just the same. So this aspect of the Euro, which was very obvious and practical in its time, is obsolete. - The economies of the core EU states and the rest of Europe are vastly different. A single currency, by design, isn't going to be flexible enough to cover a range of economies from the manufacturing powerhouse of Germany to peripheral, smaller, often much more rural places like Greece and Bulgaria. This came to a head in the 2010s for the former country, who suffered greatly in a debt crisis caused by domestic factors, but which was exasperated by rules set upon it by the Eurozone. I highly recommend watching a Yannis Varoufakis lecture on his time in office during that crisis, he's one of the very precious few leftist Euro critics out there. - The other appeal of the European Union outside of economics and trade is the stability of centralized bureaucracy. A centralized power protects each member state and allows them to coordinate politically and militarily. As I said, this is an idea that started after World War II, but took on new character during the Cold War, the fall of communist governments, and now the dynamic between the US and Russia. With the economic details of Eurozone integration being opaque to the common man (and even to most in the bureaucracy, but they won't admit it), this east-west dynamic is the core understanding of the Eurozone and the central axis around which almost every discussion or argument about the Euro rotates around. This is the social baggage I mentioned in my disclaimer at the top of the comment. Being a "Euro-skeptic" is a good guarantor of other right wing sentiments, most of the time entirely unrelated to what from the outside seems like a kind of dry economic or practical question of a monetary union. - In Eastern Europe, Euroskepticism is a good barometer for proximity to Russia and sympathetic views on Russia, its activities in the region, and Russian culture and its history in Eastern Europe in general. For Eastern countries which have not joined the Euro yet, but which have signed agreements to eventually such as Romania or Hungary, the Euro represents an active question of total allegiance to US-by-proxy interests regarding Russia. For the two Scandinavian EU states which did not adopt the Euro - Denmark given an exemption from the original Maastricht treaty and Sweden being unofficially but firmly resisting what is supposed to be, under the letter of the law, an eventual adoption - the question is again of anti-Russian sentiment, but sometimes framed in social discourse, paradoxically, as a bulwark against Trumpian instability. There have been whispers of the talk in Sweden, famously neutral, and all the Scandinavian states, who like to see themselves as marching to the beat of their own drum. But times have changed, people have changed. - Having recently lived through the most recent Euro adoption (Bulgaria in the beginning of this year) there is indeed the vague sense that we have given up a part of ourselves to join the faceless bureaucracy, as well as exasperation with inflation and rising prices. The Lev was not just "ours" but a living link to the beginning of modern Bulgarian independence. I think most people feel this way here, but the aforementioned social dialectic (a not entirely organic one, to me) seems to push out reasonable disappointment in favor of full-on Euro attachment or the usual pro-Russia right wing nonsense. Every Eurozone country has hints of melancholic nostalgia for their previous currencies, even those that have been in the Eurozone for decades at this point. One example that comes to mind is the cult video game My Summer Car, which takes place in Finland, but proudly shows some longing for the past by making the in-game currency their old Markki along with older car models, brands and so on. I think this quiet nostalgia for "what was once ours" isn't going to weaken any time soon, especially as European stagnation continues. I guess I should add, since you did ask me for my personal opinion on things. Like I said, I don't like centralization of authority or strong authoritarianism of any kind. I think the appeal of authority is misanthropic as it reduces human beings to numbers or particles that need to be controlled, and reinforces a cycle of helplessness and overall degradation. I don't oppose bureaucratic structure on principle - like I am not, in a serious fashion, against car registration or passports or whatnot - but it's safe to say that the giant behemoth of European bureaucracy is huge and pretty much out of control. It seems to exist only to beget itself, something that happens in any gigantic bureaucratic structure like in the US, but in Europe it's just that much more pointless. Beyond that, I don't have a partisan view on east-west relations, I don't think Russia is the new Great Satan, I can clearly tell the heavy and manic American influence in Europe, both politically, socially, and in the propaganda department, and stemming from that, participating in the American war machine by proxy is something I am firmly against. I don't buy into the narrative that global polarity is inevitable and smaller countries must rush to be under a bigger brother's umbrella lest we end up like Cuba; well, at least, I think that international relations must play out as such to allow smaller nation-states to thrive independently, and that so-called "realpolitik" is a self-fulfilling prophecy.

>>11020 Not the guy you were responding to I just want to say that this was a very lucid and interesting post, thanks.

>>11020 Do you think it's possible to separate a theoretical "Europeanism" from the reality of the bureaucratic EU which exists now?

>>11022 Wanted to express the same sentiments. This kind of compelling and though invoking post really makes me appreciate these last bastions against the tide of drivel.

>>11090 MAGISTERIAL article by Big Perry ("Francis Rory Peregrine 'Perry' Anderson") in the LRB: lrb.co.uk/the-paper/v42/n24/perry-anderson/the-european-coup

>>11090 Sure, there's no reason it shouldn't be possible. That's the answer I'd give prima facie to such a question. But it merits a bit more digging: What does "Europeanism" actually entail, and why do we want it? Does it mean agreements like Schengen which allow free travel between countries, Erasmus, Eurorail? Or is it more of a good vibes thing but without "official" integration? Is it just the European Union or is it all bureaucracies? Switzerland and Norway aren't in the EU, but they're in the EEA. I don't think a bureaucratic conglomerate is an inevitability, and I don't even like hearing arguments explaining its existence as somehow essential to European character (and therefore indicative of either fatalistic pessimism or superiority in development). I think in the future it will be seen as a part of its time; essential to solving several problems on the continent as well as being a good alternative to the rule of the nation-state, a genuine belief, somewhere in that morass, of liberal values and progressing forward. I think we easy take for granted many details that have only come around thanks to a unified bureaucratic force, things that are so obvious that they aren't even brought up anymore as the product of integration, like all of us (almost) driving on the same side of the road, or using the same plug (sort of, but I won't give this comment up to Wikipedia autism now), or being on the same cell phone frequencies. These are genuinely good moves, and they don't happen with a light touch of bureaucracy. That's why I don't bother calling myself a "euro-skeptic", because I respect the idea behind it, and I always think it's worth pointing out. I just think its historical context is more important and beneficial than what it's giving us today. I think what you are searching for with this question is a sense of goodwill among all the European peoples, a common respect, a little bit less of the infighting. Cultural and social rather than literal. That'll have to come from the bottom up, you simply can't force people to like each other. But that is putting the cart before the horse. The bedrock of contention between countries is differences in economy and labor. The West-East and North-South axes in Europe are so firmly entrenched that even young children pick up on it. Germany, France, and the UK are gigantic economies compared to the smaller countries with a magnitude more population in some cases. That doesn't mean being richer but being larger economies with significant export and manufacturing sectors. To paraphrase Varoufakis, speaking from the Greek perspective: the Germans sell us washing machines and cars and we sell them back... oranges. That's not the trading relationship of equal partners. The true role of the lesser states of the EU is as consumers, both for goods and for credit. "Europeanism" will never exist as long as gastarbeiters are a main cog in producing in the west and sending money back to the east. Of course, not every sore point in the meeting of cultures comes from economic differences. I think that's reductionist and a watered-down millennials' understanding of Marxism. But being on equal footing has a way of massaging social differences, and makes people more amenable to those differences between them. In the absence of gaps in economy and labor, I don't think there are any significant social differences between any two countries in the European continent that would drive them to dislike each other anew. We are well into the secular era, so it's hard to imagine, say, a Norwegian Lutheran being so offended by the Papists to the south that he doesn't want to vacation there on holiday or buy Italian pasta or whatever. There were ethnic conflicts in Europe in the 90s, but they both had material bases - in Northern Ireland, the rule of power of the UK, and in the Balkans, the economic and political dominance of the Serbs. The religious character both of those conflicts had wasn't incidental, but it wasn't the foundation of the conflicts either. And while I think there will always be a portion of the population that tend to fixate on racial and ethnic differences, in our globalized world the scope of comparison has widened plenty, and only the most pedantic are left caring about whether Spaniards, Albanians, Finns, or Russians count as "European" or "white". You can see this play out in the UK, where once Poles were the main concern over immigration (here is that labor thing again), now they are benign, even tongue-in-cheek fondly remembered, with the mostly unsaid subtext of "at least they were white European Christians". So we are back to the original question. Why do we want Europeanism? If it is to celebrate Europe in all its shades, that will come organically once we move on from consumer capitalism and the labor market. If it's to protect against "the barbarian hordes" from the global south, it's a hollow and temporary premise, not to mention bigoted. Personally, I don't think the kind of social Europeanism you bring up will happen in our lifetime, with or without the bureaucracy of the EU and associated structures. There was a push by liberal Europhile types to make pan-Europeanism a thing after the invasion of Ukraine, and politicians still hug each other over common defense, but that feels removed from the common person's experience of Europe; and besides, military is the original bureaucratic entity. I think what characterizes our era is countries searching for their identity, redefining themselves, like the process of decolonization in other continents, and this takes the place of a full-throated zeal for continental unity. The UK have been doing this since time immemorial, of course, swinging between being Euro blood, being "different", and thinking their island as if they were in the middle of the Atlantic ocean and not a literal human swimmable distance to "the continentals". The post-communist countries obviously still live in the shadow of that time. If you've ever talked to a Polish or Czech person who insists on making sure you agree that they are Central European and not Eastern European, they do it out of concern about their image to the rich west, not strict ideological disagreements with socialism-- and they make this distinction in spite of the objective similarities they have with the Easterners they hate so much, such as cultural and linguistic heritage. That's the situation each European country finds themselves in: looking inward to define the national character, redefining history and identity, closing the gates to preserve being eroded by modernism, consumerism, technology, globalisation, American pop culture, and migrants. In light of this, what's the hope of continental brotherhood?

>>11134 >Over a glass of wine, the Bildungslücke is easily remedied. NEW LEFT REVIEW CHADS BACK EUROCUCKS BTFO

>>11134 can you give a summary of what this very long article is about please?

>>11137 The article is itself a summary Just read it

>>11139 Radically flip-flopping on racial identity issues is one of the great pony tricks the reactionary right has, but at some point you get desensitized to it. The Nazis had their "honorary Aryans". Gawking at the hypocrisy only ends up validating it, really. I think the extreme focus on whiteness in contrast with non-European foreigners might be more pronounced in the UK. I don't see the same thing in Germany or France or Sweden. The case of the UK is particular with its colonial history (thus explaining the Farage opinion - I wonder what he thinks of that line now ten years later) as well as its closer proximity and absorption of American identity politics. I think for the Brits in particular, pan-European white solidarity seems like an attractive idea in concept, but I see that they recognize that unassailable element of foreignness in us, our foods, our music and dances, our mannerisms and demeanor. Identity solely defined on a negative - they aren't thirdies - is hollow and will collapse like a house of cards the next day when the migrant crisis blows over and the rightoids decide we're not real whites anymore. I do wish the duller of my compatriots recognized that dynamic but they're too busy with their BMVs. And I think it's worth clarifying that the Poles have indeed made a great leap in relative economic worth, and what applies to south east Europe probably doesn't apply to them anymore.

>>11146 farage infamously used to march around his school as a teen chanting national front slogans, there is no way he is at all allergic to white nationalism.... it must just have been political expediency that led him to express that bizarre 'opinion'

>>11165 Leave it up to the Americans to drag everyone else down to their basement retard level.

>>11169 we literally saved you europeans in WW2. keep up the hateful rhetoric, and you’ll end up putting each other in camps again. i don’t think america will be there to save you a second time. when europe falls, it will be because they refused to be saved. doctor who will be played by chris evans. the islamic call to prayer will sound in every speaker from lisbon to warsaw. we could have stopped it. you just wouldn’t let us.

>>11176 Not proven.

>>11181 how do you prove anything that happened in a playground 40 years ago? I bet it's true, though.

>>11352 what threat do you think Islamists constitute exactly ?

>>11352 They say it's the devil you know... "Islamism" in the UK and France are not true philosophical/theological re-awakenings but a reaction by immigrant groups to maintain social, economic and ethnic ties. I don't see it as an ideological threat because it is an in-group phenomenon that doesn't have a strong proselytizing presence - that is, converting people who were not Muslims beforehand, not ethnic immigrants who were already nominally Muslim when they immigrated. A handful of bullied gingers or whoever seems to be converting doesn't invalidate this. As a theological movement it is next to pointless against the all-consuming modern secular condition, against social media and globalized content, and against the power of assimilation. People are impatient and think that every immigrant is going to shed their root culture, their language and habits, the second they step off the plane. The Anglo countries (I think the situation in France is a little different) have an unassailable power to assimilate people into the fold in as little as two generations. People don't realize how remarkable that is because they already live with that as a given. Inasmuch as domestic-grown Islamism is a byproduct of immigration and ethnic relations, its time is limited as an ideological force. Since you are all males perhaps you can see yourself acclimating to joining Islam, even enjoying or benefiting from it, like you see the immigrants do-- but make no mistake, you will be hard pressed to find a second-generation immigrant girl who chose to re-don the veil or other head coverings. They exist, but that sort of action is almost always spurred by familial pressure and not a genuine desire to cover up. Love Island, Depop, Sephora, Get Ready With Me on Tiktok; it beats Ramadan for the vast majority of young ethnic girls seeing themselves at the crossroads between cultures. Meanwhile, my ire is directed at rightoids because their dysfunction more often gets in the way of real progress. For example, for many years the right were against any discussion or approach towards the topic of the environment and climate change. If you are 25 or younger you probably don't remember that dynamic, but it took until at least the tail end of the millennial generation for rightoids to renege on the whole "environmental issues are for hippie loser degenerates" thing. Now that didn't happen because younger reactionaries all of a sudden became wiser, it changed because climate impacts are no longer debatable even for the most retarded. But they quickly changed their tune and remembered that actually nature is cool and based and trad and hey wasn't the phrase "blood and soil" anyway? And how much progress could we have made for the past 60 years if the rightoids weren't so obstinate about it? How can I be less mad at their obstinate hypocrisy and constant tantrums, I have to be mad at the immigrants instead, who by and large don't vote anyway, right that's one of the roots of the whole un-assimilated thing, is that they don't participate in civil institutions, they may flood empty marketplaces with kebab shops but they aren't flooding Parliament with elected officials. I see in right-wingers a genuine concern about the declining state of society-- good! But they misplace it by focusing entirely on ethnic conflict, and occasionally when they get bored identity issues like gays and trannies. I dislike this not just because I think marginalized groups are worth defending, but because the real consequence is that it leads us nowhere, creates time-wasting infighting and strife when it's clear we don't have that luxury anymore.

>>11354 Is this a serious question?

>>11358 A lot of this comment I agree with but I have to pull you up on this: > How can I be less mad at their obstinate hypocrisy and constant tantrums, I have to be mad at the immigrants instead, who by and large don't vote anyway, right that's one of the roots of the whole un-assimilated thing, is that they don't participate in civil institutions, they may flood empty marketplaces with kebab shops but they aren't flooding Parliament with elected officials. It's obvious that the Islamic vote is an important constituency in the UK and of ever increasing relevance. There are about half a dozen MPs now whose political position is basically 'political Islam', clearly this has been accelerated by the genocide in Gaza but it was probably going to happen at some point anyway. And a lot of Labour MPs are now in a situation where their seat is contingent on maintaining the Muslim vote. Obviously finding the most anti-Pakistani Pakistani in England in Shabhana Mahmood has been a stroke of political genius for Labour but even so it is undoubtable that their reliance on Muslim voters has made it substantially harder for them to be tough on parallel communities.

>>11369 Meant for >>11358

>>11360 Thanks for clarifying, my lack of real knowledge about domestic British politics is apparent. I'm not from there but I try to keep up with British politics because I find it interesting. Ethnic minorities using their edge vote to take parties or issues hostage is nothing new and exists anywhere where there is a significant enough minority to do so. Now I could be wrong but my read on UK Islamists is that there's a purity race to the top to see who can be the most stringent worshiper and adhere to the rules most severely specifically as a purity test and a reaction against English and European secular society. It is as much a reaction against native Brits as it is against seeing their younger generation slip away from what they see as their own values. And that the British allowed them to step on their toes way more than they should have, having been lulled by liberal academic theory -- we could even call it a battle of theologies, really, one explicitly secular and one nominally. We are all in one way or another under the tent of "not-woke" so you won't see me defending the extremes of social justice ideology. I can easily acknowledge how it contributed to this situation.

>>11361 Can you please talk a bit more about your theory that the inevitable arc of society is towards muslim communities becoming more integrated and more liberal. I would certainly like to believe it, having at many times expressed a belief the necessity for Islam in the west to become more like one of the established christian churches in its relationship to politics and society, but at the same time this goes against some of what we hear from the newspapers - namely, that second and third generation immigrants are potentially as conservative if not even more so than their parents. I certainly agree that liberalism is likely to be popular with Muslim girls and young women, but it's not true that Islam has no defense - it's quite easy for them to paint white women as whores and barren hedonists in a way that I think could be quite compelling to someone raised in an Islamic context. And besides, the whole thing about a patriarchal society is that it doesn't really matter whether women like it or not, they don't get to choose one way or the other. What also has to be considered is that even if there is a moderate flux towards more liberal attitudes in muslim communities, this can easily be completely outweighed by newly arrived immigrants with hardline views. A tight immigration policy, and arguably some political strategy for weakening or even breaking family and clan links between British Muslims and their relations in Kashmir and Bangladesh and so on, is almost certainly a prerequisite for the production of a more tolerant Church of England style Islam (Islam of England?).

>>11362 I would not characterize the process as either inevitable - nothing is inevitable and everything is subject to change - nor as towards those communities becoming more integrated and liberal. What I mean to express is that sooner or later Islam will lose its theological and ideological power. It may very well remain as an ethnic signifier far longer into the future, but only as that. We already see it is younger people who call themselves "Muslims", even vociferously-- but they have sex out of wedlock (or even homosexual relations), smoke weed and use other narcotics, and even drink, do not attend prayer five times a day, are much laxer about fasting during Ramadan, the women much more open with their clothing choices (how halal are skinny jeans and makeup?) and other such Muslim rules. That is not to get into the theological aspect of believing in god, in divinity and the concept of heaven and the primacy of holiness over science. It's already a cliche that the only thing they DO insist on following is not eating pork, and being real insistent on it. Well, that's their right of course. This is a hollowing out of the very theological grounds of Islam, just as happened to Christianity. It is inevitable, sooner or later. Now, that does not mean that it won't remain as an ethnic or in-group signifier, but it will be just that, an ethnic thing, hollow to everyone but kept as a facade. And that does not mean that they will become liberal on traditionally liberal issues such as feminism, gay rights, and so on. But there is already an easy template for opposing those things from a secular basis. The white reactionaries would put us in headscarves too if they didn't see it as synonymous with foreign invaders. >namely, that second and third generation immigrants are potentially as conservative if not even more so than their parents. It's a reaction against cultural assimilation and an attempt to regain one's identity. I think it's a multifaceted reaction: the weakening of civil institutions and neoliberalism eradicating public life, declining localism and alienation from local and agricultural labor, the powerful influence of the internet and its ability to unmoor us from our immediate surroundings, and of course the typical economic marginalization that gets brought up by leftists at this point. I should also point out that conservatism has always been used as a tool to gain power over others generally, so it's not surprising that immigrants from more militant, patriarchal cultures found new wind in it. This is a well-commented phenomenon from the other side of the looking glass too. Many a liberal Turk has complained about Erdogan's thriving support from Turkish communities in Germany, some as you point out, two or three generations deep. Their vote (and money) has a lot of sway in their home country, despite the obvious hypocrisy of not living there, or in some cases, not even speaking the language that well. Every diaspora community deals with this phenomenon to some effect or another, which is why I don't see this as some terminal illness specific to Muslims in the UK. >it's quite easy for them to paint white women as whores and barren hedonists This is something men are wont to do in every culture on Earth. Sexual tensions sit underneath ethnic/religious/cultural mores, not caused by them. >And besides, the whole thing about a patriarchal society is that it doesn't really matter whether women like it or not, they don't get to choose one way or the other. Britain is not a patriarchal society, at least not in the useful sense of that definition. To become a true patriarchal society, the society in question's *men* have to choose to disregard women's rights as an ideal over power. In a developed western country like Britain this would mean not just a sea change in culture but radical overhaul of existing legal and bureaucratic institutions. Is the Muslim takeover of Britain really close enough to fruition to overwrite 100+ years of post-suffrage legal precedent? Not so sure about that. This is another reason why I find it more fruitful to argue against right wingers over Islamists, as the latter have already made their choice, dictated to them by their theology, while the former aren't anchored to dogma and can be swayed one way or the other. >this can easily be completely outweighed by newly arrived immigrants with hardline views. I know Islam emphasizes its cross-ethnic brotherhood, but this ideal is something that has to be actively worked at, and not something that people are innately drawn towards. Europe also at one point had "Christendom", but it only took us so far. People will identify with their ethnic group first, and religious teaching - or civic and national integration - secondary. This "fallback" leaps out, seemingly out of nowhere, when economic, labor and intersocial conditions degrade. Multi-generation immigrants also frequently strive to differentiate themselves from newer immigrants. This goes back to the Polish comparison I made earlier - the more the newer crop of immigrants comes in, the more important it becomes, socially and economically, to be "one of the good ones", even going as far as self-hatred and erasure of ones' history. I see the Black population of the UK framing themselves this way: an authentic part of the Commonwealth, native English speakers, undeniable contributors to English culture such as music. >the production of a more tolerant Church of England style Islam (Islam of England?). I think Islam's theological basis makes it more resistant to overt liberalization and that we shouldn't hope for it to happen any time soon as sort of a natural evolution that all religions must take. It's not impossible for it to contain liberal facets, but those always seem to run out of steam. I think what's more likely is a watering down of Muslim ideology like what you see in Turkey, the Balkans, and peripheral stretches of Islam like in Africa and South East Asia, where the people identify as Muslim, but this takes on a much more regional, folsky and idiosyncratic character.

>>11369 Meant for >>11358

>>11369 >you must breed to save the huwaite race or else you're a useless whore Nah I'm good

>>11372 Well that’s the rub isn’t it? You see the duty of family as a burden, whereas Muslim women see it as an honor. And so we decay while they grow.

>>11374 *They are forced into marriage with their cousins and raped

>>11375 They absolutely see it as a honor and duty, for which Islam rewards them with the title of “queen of the household.” I don’t see it as a “noble savage” thing, it’s a key to the success of their civilization. Muslim women might not see it in such strategic terms but Islam owes much of its current success to their commitment. >>11379 I don’t dislike Muslim women, if anything I applaud them. My criticism is that Western women have abandoned that duty. Now certainly one can say Western men abandoned their duty first and that is largely true. In fact I think that is what needs to be fixed, no point in convincing women to take up their duties when we have abandoned ours.

>>11379 got his ass

>>11375 They absolutely see it as a honor and duty, for which Islam rewards them with the title of “queen of the household.” I don’t see it as a “noble savage” thing, it’s a key to the success of their civilization. Muslim women might not see it in such strategic terms but Islam owes much of its current success to their commitment. >>11379 I don’t dislike Muslim women, if anything I applaud them. My criticism is that Western women have abandoned that duty. Now certainly one can say Western men abandoned their duty first and that is largely true. In fact I think that is what needs to be fixed, no point in convincing women to take up their duties when we have abandoned ours.

>>11379 If the word 'force' is used in the normal way, there is no 'force' involved for most of these women. If the definition of 'force' is different here, does that only apply in this case, or in other cases? Your definition is I think quite novel. Men who commit honour killings (a practice which arrived in the UK only recently) are entangled in the same web of obligations, social mores, norms, and religious goo as are the women whose cause you have taken up. Nobody would ever consider that the men, in these cases, are somehow not fully responsible for their behaviour. >>11383 If Michael Corleone had not 'stepped up' to take Vito's place, he would have been disowned. And so what? It'd be absurd to see him as a victim. You talk as if there is some truly 'outside', external, satellitic view you have obtained. Has it ever occurred to you that your life, viewed from their perspective, would seem just as dismal as theirs do from yours?

>>11382 honor and duty or the fact that most human beings cannot stomach being disowned by their parents/community? which is what will happen if they don't marry and have kids

>>11379 If the word 'force' is used in the normal way, there is no 'force' involved for most of these women. If the definition of 'force' is different here, does that only apply in this case, or in other cases? Your definition is I think quite novel. Men who commit honour killings (a practice which arrived in the UK only recently) are entangled in the same web of obligations, social mores, norms, and religious goo as are the women whose cause you have taken up. Nobody would ever consider that the men, in these cases, are somehow not fully responsible for their behaviour. >>11383 If Michael Corleone had not 'stepped up' to take Vito's place, he would have been disowned. And so what? It'd be absurd to see him as a victim. You talk as if there is some truly 'outside', external, satellitic view you have obtained. Has it ever occurred to you that your life, viewed from their perspective, would seem just as dismal as theirs do from yours?

>>11386 what are you taking about? vito initially didn't want michael to take over and even after Sonny's death when he realises michael would be the right person to take over he does not impose this fate on him. it's michael who wants to take over. Michael would've never been disowned